THE INDIAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
State court acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction over reservation-based claims is not a direct attack on tribal sovereignty but is an expansion of the states' own judicial authority. 3 While not actively diminishing tribal court jurisdiction, concurrent state court jurisdiction brings about the same troubling side effects by questioning the validity of the tribal court system and undermining the effect of tribal laws.
Part II of this article begins with an examination of the jurisdictional divide in tribal-state relations, discussing first the instances where tribal and state court subject matter jurisdiction are independently exclusive. 4 It then looks to factors that courts have held as relevant when finding that concurrent tribal and state court jurisdiction exist, and reviews three state court decisions accepting concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising in Indian country. 5 Finally, this part scrutinizes the soundness of these and other state court decisions regarding their acceptance and exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over reservation-based claims. 6 For purposes of analogy, part I explores the application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in federal courts. 7 The Doctrine essentially asserts that, although federal and tribal court jurisdiction may be concurrent, where a cause of action arises in Indian country or involves a "reservation affair," the federal court should abstain from exercising its concurrent jurisdiction.'" Cases arising on the reservation are necessarily reservation affairs. Thus, federal abstention is mandatory where a cause of action arises in Indian country.
Mandatory abstention is justified in that federal courts are permitted a limited appellate review of tribal court decisions after exhaustion. 9 With this premise in mind, part IV explores whether the Indian Abstention Doctrine should be applied at all in state courts, and, if so, to what extent.
States also accomplish their goal of regulating Indian country through legislative action aimed at taxing activities on the reservation. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2217 (1995) (holding that state could not apply motor fuels tax to fuels sold by tribe in Indian country, but state could tax income of member Indians working on the reservation but residing off-reservation); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 128 (1993) (finding that state income or motor vehicle taxes imposed on tribal members living in Indian country are invalid); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151, 161 (1980) (imposing nondiscriminatory state tax on nonmember smoke shop customers); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (eliminating state's ability to tax tribe or tribal members living and working in Indian country).
13. By their very existence, Indian nations lessen state power by diminishing the states' land base and tax base. This is the primary reason that states desire to control Indian country.
14. 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
This part looks to United States Supreme Court language in one of the seminal Indian Exhaustion decisions and recent federal court precedent that suggest that the principles of the Doctrine should apply to state courts." Turning to the question of the extent to which the doctrine should apply, this part concludes that abstention is not mandatory in state court because state courts cannot serve as appellate reviewers of tribal courts: the justification for mandatory abstention is missing." Part IV recommends a discretionary application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine by state courts over reservationbased claims.
Finally, part V suggests that this discretionary abstention should be based on the outcome of a state court's choice of law analysis. If tribal law is applicable, the state court should dismiss the action; however, if state law is applicable, the state court should provide a forum for the litigants.' This part also discusses the doctrine of forum non conveniens which provides an analogy for the reasoning that tribal laws cannot and should not be interpreted or applied in state court. The doctrine also provides additional factors which a state court should consider in its discretionary review.Y Such discretionary dismissal in state court for reservation-based claims will serve the rationale set forth by the Supreme Court in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual while continuing to permit state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over cases affecting strong state interests. [Vol. 21
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THE INDIAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
through treaty provisions, federal statutes, and, in certain areas, as a result of the dependent status of Indian nations.' Tribal court subject matter jurisdiction is also limited to those areas that are necessary to the protection of tribal self-government and continued control over internal relations." State court jurisdiction is limited where the exercise of state court jurisdiction would infringe upon tribal sovereignty" or where it is preempted by existing federal law.' These two barriers to state court jurisdiction are commonly referred to as the infringement and the preemption tests. Absent express limitation on either court system's jurisdiction, concurrent tribal and state court subject matter jurisdiction may exist.
This section will examine the extent of tribal and state court jurisdiction after applying the above stated limitations; first, detailing the situations where tribal and state court jurisdiction are independently exclusive. The discussion will then look to examples of concurrent tribal and state court jurisdiction, and examine three state court cases accepting concurrent jurisdiction where the action involved arose in Indian country.
A. Exclusive Jurisdiction
The term jurisdiction generally refers to the power or authority of a government to govern. The scope of jurisdiction is defined by the subject matter over which a government's courts have the authority to adjudicate. In tribal-state relations, exclusive jurisdiction refers to subject matter jurisdiction that one government enjoys to the exclusion of the other.
Exclusive Tribal Court Jurisdiction
As a general rule of federal Indian law, 9 where a case arises on the reservation and involves only Indians, tribal court jurisdiction will be exclusive." The United States Supreme Court similarly held that tribal court jurisdiction is exclusive of both state and federal courts where the defendant is an Indian and the cause of action arose on the reservation.
3 ' The rationale behind these two general rules is that it is an essential function of tribal sovereignty to regulate both the conduct of individual Indians and Indian country. Tribal governments maintain a significant interest in resolving disputes affecting either of these factors exclusive of state interference."
Another major reason for excluding state court jurisdiction over actions arising in Indian country and involving individual Indians is based upon the federal government's exclusive relationship with Indian nations. Cohen stated: "[T]he Constitution delegated paramount authority over Indian affairs to the federal government." 33 The Supreme Court said in Rice v. Olsen, "The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." ' 
Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court recently recognized that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without congressional delegation."
3 Under this formula, state court jurisdiction exists exclusive of a tribal court's jurisdiction over actions occurring outside of reservation boundaries between non-Indians and over some off-reservation disputes involving Indians."
While the courts have attempted to draw bright lines of jurisdiction in tribal-state relations, many areas of ambiguity exist. Most of these ambiguous areas involve complex fact patterns arising in Indian country. It is in these areas that state courts have attempted to take control by assuming concurrent jurisdiction. 
THE INDIAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE B. Concurrent Tribal and State Court Jurisdiction
Concurrent jurisdiction recognizes the power to adjudicate a matter in more than" one sovereign's justice system. Several courts may have concurrent jurisdiction over a single transitory or "moveable" cause of action. Thus, a plaintiff with a transitory cause of action will have a variety of courts from which to chose to file her lawsuit? 7 In federal Indian law, concurrent tribal and state court jurisdiction usually involves matters arising in Indian country. When a state court accepts concurrent jurisdiction over a reservation-based claim and applies its own laws to that controversy, it is unilaterally accepting the power to regulate Indian country, undermining the authority of tribal law and the tribal court system. Concurrent jurisdiction is especially troublesome where tribal and state laws, policies, and practices conflict with one another.
Two major factors govern jurisdictional conflicts in the area of tribal-state relations: (1) the status of the parties involved; and (2) the situs of the cause of action.' As stated above, tribal courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction over reservation-based claims involving only Indians. 9 Conversely, tribal courts are excluded from adjudicating actions occurring off the reservation involving only non-Indians.' The bright line of jurisdiction ends when non-Indians enter the reservation.
The existence of a non-Indian in a dispute plays a significant role in a state court's decision to accept concurrent jurisdiction over a matter. Several state courts have recognized concurrent state and tribal court jurisdiction over actions where an Indian nation or an individual Indian sues a non-Indian in state court for a reservation-based claim. 4 ' Some state courts have found exclusive jurisdiction over reservation-based claims involving only nonIndians. 4 These courts view infringement as less evident because nonIndians play a less significant role in tribal sovereignty. 43 Another significant source of concurrent state court jurisdiction over actions arising in Indian country is Public Law 280.' Enacted in 1953, the original version of Public Law 280 offered any state which was not expressly given jurisdiction, the option to unilaterally assume criminal and civil To summarize the jurisdictional divide in tribal-state relations: non-Public Law 280 states may have concurrent jurisdiction over reservation-based claims where the defendant is a non-Indian, and may have exclusive jurisdiction over reservation claims involving only non-Indians. States which have adopted Public Law 280 enjoy the same jurisdiction; however, added to their subject matter is jurisdiction over reservation-based claims involving Indians. These rules seems clear enough, but, as will be shown below, state courts push the limits of these factors in order to obtain concurrent jurisdiction over reservation-based claims. The following briefly reviews three state court cases accepting concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising within Indian country. Sanapaw v. Smith' involved a reservation-based tort claim between two enrolled members of the Menominee Indian Tribe.' The plaintiff, Richard Sanapaw, filed an action in state court for damages resulting from injuries sustained from a battery committed by the defendant, Bernard Smith.' The defendant moved the court to dismiss the plaintiff's claim, asserting that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over actions between Indians arising on the reservation.' The state trial court found that it had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.' The trial court reasoned that the defendant, while an enrolled member, did not reside on the Menominee Indian Reservation, and thus, he was a non-Indian for purposes of jurisdiction 5 In Sanapaw, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin recognized that "one who is recognized racially as an Indian may nevertheless be recognized as a nonIndian or 'emancipated' Indian for jurisdictional purposes." ' The Sanapaw court then listed factors to consider when determining whether a person is an Indian for "jurisdictional purposes."' The court suggested that the trial court should consider blood quantum, racial status, membership, habits, and lifestyle, including place of residence. 8 In the end, the court reversed the trial court's ruling because the trial court based its decision solely on the defendant's place of residence.
9 Regardless, Sanapaw stands as dangerous precedent. Placing a jurisdictional determination solely on the finding of the race of the defendant completely ignores the tribe's sovereign authority over its territory. complaint for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the Jemez Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. 62 The Court of Appeals of New Mexico rejected this contention and assumed concurrent jurisdiction over the case, finding that state court concurrent jurisdiction was not preempted by federal law and would not infringe upon the sovereignty of the Jemez Pueblo."
In its jurisdictional analysis, the court admitted that all parties involved were Indians and that the cause of action arose in Indian country.' The Waconduo court nevertheless accepted concurrent jurisdiction over the case because "[tihe Defendant failed to show how recognizing concurrent jurisdiction in tribal and state courts would impinge upon tribal sovereignty in the present case." ' The court reasoned that nonmember Indians were in fact non-Indians for jurisdictional purposes.' To justify this reasoning, the Wacondo court quoted the Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina' 2 for the premise that "tribes are not merely fungible groups of homogenous persons among whom amy Indian would feel at home. On the contrary, wide variations in customs, art, language, and physical characteristics separate the tribes, and their history has been marked by both intertribal alliances and animosities." ' Wacondo is an extreme example of the extent to which state court judges will go to assume control over Indian reservations. The court committed three major errors in devising its conclusion: first, it improperly classified nonmember Indians as non-Indians contrary to Congress' affirmation of retained tribal sovereignty over "all Indians; 69 Both the passenger and the driver were members and residents of the Reservation." The plaintiff-passenger sued the driver in a Washington state court for damages caused by the driver's negligence.' At trial, the superior court granted the defendant-driver's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the alleged tort occurred in Indian country. ' On appeal, the Denison court reversed and remanded the case for trial, finding that the State of Washington properly assumed concurrent jurisdiction over civil actions involving Indians and occurring on reservation highways."' The defendant insisted that jurisdiction over this tort action should be extended to the tribal court under the principles of comity.' However, the Denison court refused, reasoning that the State of Washington "had a strong interest in assuring the full compensation of persons injured in automobile 72 accidents."'" The Court further reasoned that the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over Indian country pursuant to Public Law 280 was to provide individual Indians with a forum to settle their disputes."
The Denison court's reasons for assuming concurrent jurisdiction may be considered an attenuated choice of law analysis. However, the court did not mention whether the Spokane Indian Tribe's laws were inconsistent with the laws of the state of Washington on this issue. If the tribal laws were not inconsistent, the court should have noted that tribal law should be used."
C. The Reasoning Behind the Acceptance of State Court Jurisdiction Over Reservation-Based Claims is Misplaced
As evinced above, much of the jurisprudence dealing with tribal court jurisdiction depends upon the race of the parties involved and the situs of the cause of action. However, most state courts base their finding of concurrent state and tribal court jurisdiction on the single fact that non-Indians are involved in the dispute.' These state courts base their acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction on two factors: (1) that states have a significant interest in providing individual Indian people with a state forum; and (2) that tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians is not "necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment,"" and thus, state court adjudication of matters involving nonIndians' actions on the reservation does not infringe upon tribal sovereignty.
Both of these reasons fail to justify concurrent state court jurisdiction over reservation-based claims. First, the premise of providing a state court forum for individual Indians completely contradicts the United States Supreme Court's language in Fisher v. District Court." The Fisher Court held that the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding, "[slince the adoption proceeding is appropriately characterized as litigation arising on the Indian reservation."' 9 The Indian-plaintiffs claimed that denying them access to the state court system would comprise impermissible racial discrimination.' The Court rejected this claim, stating:
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law. [Vol. 21
denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government. 9 '
The state courts' second contention that jurisdiction over non-Indians is not important to tribal sovereignty directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's express recognition that "[t]ribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation is an important part of tribal sovereignty.' Tribal sovereignty today is highly dependent upon many economic factors which a tribe must control through its own justice system. 3 With the passage of the Indian Gaming Rights Act (IGRA)' and the expansion of tribal economic activity, 95 the presence of non-Indians on reservations has dramatically increased over the past ten years. Non-Indians regularly do business on the reservation, gamble in tribally owned casinos, purchase Indian-made art, view Indian cultural and religious activities, and simply pass through the reservation on a daily basis. A state court's regulation of this conduct presents a great threat to tribal sovereignty.
Emphasis on the race of the parties involved is misplaced when determining the jurisdictional divide in tribal-state relations. The situs of the cause of action should play the major role in a court's decision regarding jurisdiction. This factor holds with it many implications such as determining in personam jurisdiction, choice of substantive law, and convenient forum considerations. Furthermore, as this article suggests, the Indian Abstention Doctrine permits tribal courts to exercise initially exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising on the reservation and involving non-Indian defendants.' While originally applied in federal courts, this Doctrine should apply in state courts as well.' As will be shown below, the Doctrine does not divest the court of its subject matter jurisdiction, but it limits the court's exercise of 
II. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in Federal Courts
The Indian Abstention Doctrine recognizes that, although federal and tribal court jurisdiction may be concurrent, a federal court must abstain from accepting jurisdiction over suits arising on the reservation or involving "reservation affairs" 98 (1) promote the congressional policy of strengthening tribal self-governance; (2) serve the orderly administration of justice; and (3) provide the parties and the federal court involved with the benefit of the tribal court's expertise." All three of these purposes for exhaustion ate aimed towards strengthening and validating the tribal court system, a goal which the federal government has consistently encouraged.
The following discussion examines each of the three reasons for exhaustion, and briefly discusses the role of the federal court system in reviewing a tribal court's decision after exhaustion.
A. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies Promotes the Federal Policy of Encouraging Tribal Self-Governance
The first basis for the exhaustion of tribal court remedies, the policy encouraging tribal self-government, recognizes that "Indian tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.""' In addition, the Iowa Mutual Court recognized that tribal civil jurisdiction over the actions of non-Indians on reservation lands is also an important part of tribal sovereignty." These statements recognize the importance of the role that the tribal court system plays in tribal self-govemance." Thus, contrary to the congressional policy of Indian self-determination, unconditional access to the federal courts by either Indians or non-Indians would impair the validity of the tribal court system" The modem tribal court system is a relatively new approach to justice for many tribal governments. In the 1800s a few tribes adopted Anglo-American justice systems." Most tribes instead chose to maintain their traditional legal systems, which consisted of informal unwritten laws guided by behavioral norms which emerged as tribal custom."' During the policy of Assimilation (1871- restored a large amount of authority over tribal justice to the tribal governments." 4 Today tribal courts provide one of the primary forms of validation of tribal governmental authority."' Tribal courts formally recognize tribal customary law and serve to strengthen tribal governments by exercising jurisdiction to the fullest extent." 6
B. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies Serves the Orderly Administration of Justice
The second purpose of exhaustion, the orderly administration of justice, recognizes that exhaustion serves as a prophylactic measure against "procedural nightmares."". 7 Litigation may be pending in a federal and a tribal court, wasting the time and money of both governments. Thus, by mandating that parties first exhaust all available tribal remedies where a case arises on the reservation or involves a reservation affair, the Supreme Court assured the prevention of conflicting adjudications and wasted judicial resources. In order to assure the orderly administration of'justice, the Iowa Mutual Court recognized that exhaustion is not complete until the tribal appellate court is permitted an opportunity to rectify any errors the lower tribal court may have made."" Hepter v. Perkins"' provides a perfect example of the procedural nightmares that can result when parties fail to exhaust tribal remedies. Hepler involved a custody dispute between an Indian mother and her in-laws, the non- .. These four separate suits created the significant possibility of conflicting adjudications which would clearly defeat the important goal of finality in custody cases.' Furthermore, the case involved complex legal issues the answers to which were dependent upon the application of written and customary tribal law, federal law, and the laws of both the states of Alaska and Washington. m The tribal court in Hepler, recognizing federal statutes, state common law, and tribal customary law, found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. " The Hepler court employed a device of the Sitka jurisdictional code which vested the tribal court with the discretion to certify questions of tribal custom to the Sitka Court of Elders. If tribal remedies had been exhausted in the first instance, the time and economic resources of the other three court systems involved in this dispute would not have been wasted, a result the Supreme Court sought to avoid in creating the Indian Abstention Doctrine.
C. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies Provides Tribal Court's Expertise in the Application of Tribal Law
The third reason for the exhaustion of tribal court remedies is that it will provide the parties and other courts with the expertise of the "tribal courts this commentator fails to realize is that the application of the written codes and the many other tribal laws that are not written, require the knowledge of tribal custom and tradition that can only be properly applied in a tribal courtroom.'" The application of tribal law is not conducive to the adjudicatory system practiced in state and federal courts. The American legal system is an adversarial system that offers only a "win-lose solution."'" Conversely, "
[t]raditional tribal justice tends to be informal and consensual rather than adjudicative, and often emphasizes restitution rather than punishment.''. "The legal principles derived from American Indian custom distinguish the tribal nations' judicial systems from non-Indian American jurisprudence."' ' Tribal law in many cases is not written and is thus the product of fundamental traditions and customs and usages.'" Tribal courts enforce these customs by filling te gaps in the written law through the recognition of customs." Thus, (quoting Navajo Nation Supreme Court Justice Tso's affidavit) ("The Navajo culture historically did not employ writings to codify the rules which governed Navajo society. However, many of the cultural traditions and values are ... equivalent to a statute or constitutional provision in the United States laws."); see also Valencia-Weber, supra note 5, at 245-49 (noting the differences between tradition, and custom and usage, and recognizing that "tribal litigators and judges must decide whan custom and usage should be determinative in decisions").
134 When the dispute involves non-Indian activity occurring outside the reservation, however, the policies behind the tribal exhaustion rule are not so obviously served. Under these circumstances, we must depend upon the district courts to examine assiduously the National Farmers factors in determining whether comity requires the parties to exhaust their tribal remedies before presenting their dispute to the federal courts. 
D. Federal Court Review of Tribal Court Jurisdictional Findings: The Justification for Mandatory Exhaustion
Federal court review of a tribal court's jurisdictional finding provides the justification for mandatory exhaustion of tribal court remedies." 4 The primary basis for federal court review is that tribal court subject matter jurisdiction is a question that must be answered by reference to federal common law, a federal question. 4 
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However, where a tribal court's finding of subject matter jurisdiction also depends upon the facts of the case, the federal court may be required to review the decision under a different standard. 43 While a federal district court may review certain tribal court findings of subject matter jurisdiction de novo,' it must review the tribal court's fact finding under a deferential, clearly erroneous standard. 45 This view coincides with the second reason for exhaustion, the orderly administration of justice. By deferring to a tribal court's fact finding, federal courts will greatly conserve judicial resources in keeping with the "orderly administration of justice" reasoning of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual.
Additionally, the federal courts must defer to a tribal court's interpretations of tribal law. In Hinshaw v. Mahler,'" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribal Court's exercise of jurisdiction over a tort involving only nonmembers, expressly stated that "the Tribal Court's interpretation of tribal law is binding on this court."" Thus, unless the tribal court's jurisdictional determination is overruled, the federal district court must defer to the tribal court judgment.' 
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In conclusion, where a cause of action arises on the reservation and tribal and federal court jurisdiction are concurrent, a federal court must abstain to permit the tribal court, an expert in tribal law, to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction. Mandatory exhaustion is justified in that a federal court has the power to review the tribal court's acceptance of subject matter jurisdiction. Now that we understand the basis for mandatory federal court abstention, this article will now examine the application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in state courts for reservation-based claims.
IV The Indian Abstention Doctrine Applied in the State Courts
When a state court faces a reservation-based claim or a claim involving a "reservation affair," it is not clear whether the Indian Abstention Doctrine should apply. Some state courts have applied the Doctrine, 49 while many others have refused to apply it or have simply ignored it."n
A. Support for Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Courts
Support for application of the Doctrine in state courts is found in both the Supreme Court's language in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante and in recent federal court case law.
'

Supreme Court Support for State Abstention
The Iowa Mutual Court indicated that exhaustion applies to state as well as federal courts when it used the phrase "any nontribal court.
"
The Court did not define the term "nontribal court," but the plain meaning of the term must encompass all courts that are not employed in the justice systems of the various Indian nations. However, to gain a better understanding of what the Court actually meant when it used the phrase "nontribal court," this term must be placed in the proper context. 150. See e.g., Wacondo v. Concha, 873 P.2d 276, 280 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (accepting concurrent jurisdiction over a reservation tort where all parties involved were Indians; completely ignoring antic's argument that state court should abstain until tribal remedies were exhausted); Larrivee v. Morigeau, 602 P.2d 563, 571 (Mont. 1979) (holding that district court had subject matter jurisdiction because tribal ordinance granted state concurrent civil jurisdiction).
151. Judge Canby, in his Indian law treatise, also recognizes that the Doctrine should apply to state courts: "If the federal courts must defer to tribal courts to avoid undue interference with tribal adjudication of claims against non-Indians, it is difficult to see why state courts should not be required to do the same." CANBY, supra note 30, at 160.
152. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16.
[Vol. 21
Iowa Mutual involved the issue of whether a federal court should abstain from exercising its diversity jurisdiction over a reservation-based claim between a member Indian and a non-Indian insurance company.'" The Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual began by examining the infringement test set forth in Williams v. Lee." The Court recognized that state courts are generally divested of jurisdiction over "activities on Indian lands" where it would interfere with tribal sovereignty.' The Court then acknowledged that federal court jurisdiction over "matters relating to reservation affairs" also impairs tribal sovereignty." Referring to both state and federal courts in its infringement analysis, the Court recognized two scenarios where tribal sovereignty will be implicated: (1) when an activity occurs on the reservation; and (2) where the activity involves a reservation affair.
Holding that exhaustion applies to diversity cases as well as federal question cases, the Court continued by reasoning that:
[U]nconditional access to the federal forum would place it in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over reservation affairs. Adjudication of such matters by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal lawmaking authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.'1 7 This paragraph is very important. The Court is setting forth its primary reason for requiring exhaustion: the promotion of tribal self-government. In this paragraph, the Court continues to focus on the infringement test, and continues to refer to both state and federal courts by citing two very different cases for authority supporting abstention: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez and Fisher v. District Court. Martinez involved a reservation-based claim brought in federal court," while the plaintiff in Fisher sought relief in state court for her reservation-based claim. 59 In the very next sentence the Court uses the term "nontribal court" as opposed to strictly "federal court."'" This language was used apparently to include state courts within the scope of application of the Doctrine. 61 
Other Federal Court Support of State Abstention
Only two federal courts have addressed whether the application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine should be applied to state courts. Both courts have adopted the view that the Doctrine should be applied in state courts where the cause of action occurred in Indian country.
Bowen v. Doyle" involved an action brought by Dennis Bowen, the President of the Seneca Nation of Indians," r 0 against two New York State Supreme Court judges seeking to enjoin the state judges from exercising jurisdiction over a state court proceeding involving President Bowen. 64 In the state court action, several present and former officials of the Seneca Nation sought an injunction against Bowen, claiming that he acted in violation of the Seneca Nation Constitution." The state court suit was initiated after the Seneca Peacemakers Court denied the Seneca officials' motion to vacate its order enjoining one official from acting or sitting as a Council member."
Finding that the exhaustion rule should have equal application to state courts as well as federal courts, the Bowen court stated that "[a]lthough LaPlante and National Farmers Union apply th[e] exhaustion rule to actions in federal court, those decisions... compel application of the exhaustion rule to the controversy at issue here .. .. ",67 The court further reasoned that litigation of reservation disputes "in a forum other than the tribe's simply 'cannot help but unsettle a tribal government's ability to maintain authority.'... The same disruption occurs whether it is a federal or a state court that asserts jurisdiction over a civil dispute that is otherwise within the tribal court's authority.' [Vol. 21
Arizona halting further proceedings in state court m TOHA and the Tohono O'odham Nation then sought a permanent injunction from this same court.
Canyon moved the court to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. The court denied Canyon's motion, stating that "federal courts do have jurisdiction and authority to enjoin state court proceedings when it is necessary to preserve the integrity of Indian sovereignty."" Canyon next contended that the Anti-Injunction Act'7 precluded the federal court from exercising its jurisdiction. The court rejected this contention, reasoning that interpretation of Indian law was a matter of federal law, and thus, fell within the second exception of the Anti-Injunction Act.'
74
In determining where the cause of action occurred, the Schwartz court found that while the contract was negotiated and executed off of the reservation, its performance occurred exclusively within reservation boundaries.' 7 " Thus, the court considered the locus of the matter to have occurred on the reservation.' 7 Relying on the reasoning that "IIt]he question of tribal court jurisdiction should be determined, in the first instance, by the tribal court[,]"' ' the Schwartz court stated that "Canyon improperly brought this action in state court prior to exhaustion of the issues in tribal court.""' 7 These cases suggest that the Indian Abstention Doctrine should apply to state courts where the claim arises on the reservation or involves a "reservation affair." As noted above, the exhaustion rule does not divest the nontribal court of subject matter jurisdiction.'" The Doctrine, however, does limit the exercise of the nontribal court's concurrent jurisdiction. 
B. Validity of State Court Review of Tribal Court Decisions
The state courts which recognize the Indian Abstention Doctrine do not discuss whether a state court may review a tribal court's decision after exhaustion, but the implication of such a practice is abhorrent." State court appellate review of a tribal court decision expressly suggests that a state court is superior to a tribal court. Such a contention can only come from the afterbirth of the ethnocentric policies of the federal government which have long been abolished."'l State courts lack the power to review tribal court judgments for two important reasons: (1) state court appellate review of tribal court decisions would infringe upon tribal sovereignty, and (2) state appellate review is preempted by existing federal law.
State Court Review Would Infringe on Tribal Sovereignty
"The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history."'" Only "where essential tribal relations
were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized" can a state assert jurisdiction." Thus, the Supreme Court invalidates state action when it infringes upon tribal self-government."
The importance of the tribal court system to tribal sovereignty is well recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and the Congress.'" State appellate review "calling into question the validity or propriety of an act fairly attributable to the tribe as a governmental body" would inherently infringe on this sovereignty.'" Thus, the federal policies of excluding states from tribal matters and the protection and promotion of tribal self-government prevent a state court from acting as appellate reviewer of tribal court decisions. sovereign authority over actions occurring within Indian country, clearly outweigh any possible state interest in reviewing tribal court decisions, and thus such action is preempted.
State Court Review of a Tribal Court Decision is Preempted by Federal
We have now answered two major questions concerning the application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in the state court system. The Doctrine should apply in state courts where a suit's cause of action arises on the reservation or involves a "reservation affair," but, because state courts cannot review tribal court decisions, abstention is not mandatory in state courts. The final question we must answer is, "To what extent does the Doctrine apply?" I recommend that a state court should be required to apply a form of discretionary review when deciding whether to dismiss the case." Part V suggests that conflicts of law concepts, concepts usually ignored in a state court's jurisdictional analysis involving Indian nations, should guide a state court in its discretionary application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine.
V. Conflicts of Law Concepts Provide the Basis for the Discretionary Review of Abstention in State Court
"Conflicts of law occur when foreign elements appear in a lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents in sister states or foreign countries, and lawsuits from other jurisdictions are all foreign elements that may create problems in . . . choice of law."' 95 When a court faces a case involving multi-jurisdictional interests on which the laws of the two jurisdictions conflict, a choice of laws must be made." Observing choice of law principles, state courts regularly apply the laws of their sister states. Because of sufficient similarities between state laws and their court systems, application of another state's law poses no substantial problem for state courts. Similarly, federal courts apply state law with relative ease. " However, when a federal or state court is called upon to apply the laws of an Indian nation, the problem becomes complex.
I recommend that a state court's discretionary review pursuant to the Indian Abstention Doctrine consist of a choice of laws analysis to determine which set of substantive laws, 9 ' the state's or the tribe's, govern the case. The state court 194 . Abstention by definition permits the deferring court to later review the case. As shown above, state courts cannot review tribal court actions. Thus, dismissal, rather than abstention, is the appropriate term.
195. James P. https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss1/3 should also look to certain factors employed by the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens to strengthen its decision.
The leading treatise on federal Indian law recognizes that choice of law concepts apply to jurisdictional determinations involving Indian nations:
Both reason and authority support the application of... [choice of law concepts] to conflicts of laws arising between Indian tribes and other jurisdictions. Choice of law rules based on the comity principle are a flexible doctrine the reasons for which often apply to tribal jurisdictions as well as others, and courts have generally recognized tribal law in appropriate cases."
State courts, nevertheless, frequently overlook choice of law considerations when important tribal interests are at stake. Using a choice of laws analysis in a state court's discretionary review will put a stop to such oversights and will strengthen the tribal court system.
The following discussion first considers the feasibility of the application of "tribal law" in a state courtroom. This consideration is necessary, as it provides the foundation for using a choice of law analysis in a state court's discretionary review. The discussion then briefly examines the two primary schools of thought in choice of law and suggests exactly how a state court's choice of law analysis should be applied to the theory of discretionary review pursuant to the Indian Abstention Doctrine.
A. The Application of Tribal Law in State Court
Tribal courts, and tribal courts alone, should interpret tribal lawan and a state court should enter a judgment of dismissal where a case involves the interpretation of tribal law.' This premise provides the key to using a choice of law analysis in a state's discretionary review. Tribal laws are based on ingrained customs, traditions, and tribal common law derived from the decisions of the tribal courts. In many cases, tribal law is not written, leaving the federal or state court with no chance of proper application. Further, it is essential that tribal courts make determinations concerning the extent of "what is necessary to protect tribal self-government" under the Montana test, because it is the judicial body in the best position to make such a determination, Most tribal law is not conducive to state court application for both practical and conceptual reasons. Practically, proof of tribal law in a state court is at best difficult, and in some cases impossible. To gain insight to unknown foreign laws, such as unwritten tribal laws, state courts may attempt to employ proof of foreign law statutes.a However, proving the existence of foreign laws can be time consuming, expensive, and, where unwritten tribal laws are involved, sometimes impossible. "Proof of foreign laws remains notoriously difficult, particularly when the nation involved has not significantly attracted the attention of English-speaking scholars." ' ' Additionally, for purposes of our analysis regarding the Indian Abstention Doctrine, the state court must contend with the fact that many tribal elders, who hold the key to tribal customs, may not speak English or may not be permitted to divulge important tribal ideals in an open and alien state courtroom.
Conceptually, the use of most tribal law in a state adversarial system of justice will defeat the purpose behind the tribal law.a Failing to abstain from applying tribal laws will undermine the purpose of such laws, and, in turn, the authority of the tribal court system, which will lead to a corresponding decline in tribal culture.' Simply put, the fundamental value differences between tribal and state justice systems are dramatically different. The very nature of tribal law mandates that only the tribal court, whose law is at issue, be authorized to apply it.' Because of these problems, state courts should dismiss a suit where the application of tribal law presents itself. The reasoning set forth in National Farmers, recognizing that tribal courts are experts in the field of tribal law, should be similarly recognized in the state courts! 1 ' With this foundation laid, we may now explore how the conflicts of laws concepts of choice of laws and the doctrine of forum non conveniens affect a state court's discretionary abstention review.
B. Choice of Laws Analysis: A Bright-Line Approach to a State Court's Discretionary Abstention Review
The respect of a government's laws goes hand in hand with the exercise of its sovereignty. Civil actions arising on the reservation necessarily involve important tribal interests, and it is critical to the Indian Nations involved in such 204 [Vol. 21
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actions that their laws be recognized. A choice of laws analysis, conducted in a state court contemplating jurisdiction over an action arising on the reservation, is the judicial device which can supply this much needed recognition. When an action is brought in a state court for a cause that arose in another jurisdiction, the state court will conduct a choice of law analysis to determine whether to apply its forum law or to apply the law of the foreign jurisdiction. Most states follow one of the two major choice of law systems: (1) the Restatement First, known as the traditional choice of law theory; or (2) the Restatement Second, known as the modem choice of law theory.
Traditional Choice of Law: the Restatement First
United States traditional or common law regarding choice of laws is incorporated in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws." ' The Restatement First is essentially a territorial system based on the vested rights theory.
2" ' It is a system consisting of broad but rigid rules. The vested rights theory holds that foreign law can never operate outside of the territory of the foreign sovereign.
2 ' 2 This system is based on the premise that when an event occurs in a foreign territory, the foreign territory's law governing that occurrence vests a right in the forum court where the action is being litigated. The Restatement First's rules each govern a major area of law that identifies one particular contact." For example: questions in tort are governed by the place of the injury (lex loci delicti); 2 5 questions in contract are governed by the place of the making of the contract (lex loci contractus); 2 16 and questions in property are governed by the situs of the land.
2" ' In effect, the traditional approach holds that "the law governing a given legal interaction [is] almost always the law of the place in which certain discrete, specified events in that interaction took place." 2 8
The traditional approach to choice of laws is rigid and does not consider fairness or common sense in choosing the substantive law to apply to a particular case. In light of this problem, many state courts developed escape devices -"highly conceptual maneuvers which permitted them to avoid an undesirable outcome without breaking faith with the traditional system." It is an exercise of sovereign authority not to recognize a certain cause of action, remedy or procedure. "For centuries Indians have resolved internal disputes through unwritten customs and traditions .... Considering written tribal codes to be the sole source of tribal law is unrealistic because tribal custom may trump written tribal law as well as state law." ' 3 Decisions such as Little Horn State Bank and W.M.B. undermine the tribal court system and the tribal legislatures. To avoid such consequences, a state court's discretionary abstention analysis must adhere strictly to the choice of law analysis. If tribal law is applicable, the state court must dismiss the action. The state court should not be permitted to question the existence or substance of tribal laws. When the state courts apply the Indian Abstention Doctrine in this manner, it will ensure that tribal laws and law making authority are recognized. This will in turn further validate the tribal court system, the primary basis of the Indian Abstention Doctrine, and the goal that Congress has consistently encouraged.
2 " court conducting a FNC review must assure the parties involved that an alternative forum is available m and may condition the dismissal pursuant to FNC upon the defendant's submission to jurisdiction in the alternative forum. ' The concepts and factors employed in the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be used to strengthen a state court's discretionary abstention review. If a state court finds that a tribal court is not operating or is not accessible to all parties, then the state court need not dismiss the matter. However, private and public interest factors -such as the difficulty in obtaining witnesses and evidence, viewing premises where the cause arose, lack of state interests, and the unfairness of burdening state citizens acting as jurors to an unrelated cause of action -support state dismissal of claims arising in Indian country.
To conclude briefly, a state court's discretionary abstention analysis should maintain that: if tribal law is found applicable through a state court's choice of law analysis, the state court should refrain from exercising its concurrent jurisdiction and dismiss the action pursuant to the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in the Indian Abstention Doctrine; however, if state law is to be applied, then the state need not dismiss. This discretionary analysis ensures that state courts respect tribal sovereignty by recognizing tribal law.
The United States has often made claims about the richness of its pluralistic society -made claims that the loss ... of tribal identity would not only be a loss to . . . tribes, but would also harm all citizens because of the benefit of living in a country in which not all are required to follow the same norms.'
In order to maintain the diversity which makes American society enviously rare, the laws of America's Indian nations must be preserved by mandating their recognition in the state court system through the application of a discretionary abstention analysis.a
VI. Conclusion
Under the Indian Abstention Doctrine, where federal and tribal court jurisdiction are concurrent and the cause of action arises on the reservation, the federal court must abstain from accepting jurisdiction over the case until all available tribal remedies have been exhausted, even absent pending action in tribal court or mention of exhaustion by either party. This mandatory application 262. Id. at 254 b,22 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07). 1985) ("Indians have little political power to protect their rights .... Even though Indian rights can be easily overlooked and carelessly taken away, preservation of these rights is important to Indian and non-Indian alike.").
